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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BETTE DEANE TREMAY-NE,
Appellee,

Case No.
7348

vs.

ROY E. TREMAYNE,
AppelZant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

The brief of appellant ignores the court rule which
required appellant to make a complete statement of the
facts. It is, therefore, necessary that the respondent do
so.

THE FAC·T·S
Plaintiff and defendant were married December 19,
1941, (R. 90). He had finished three years of college
and had a normal degree which entitled him to a teacher's
certificate. He was teaching in Rupert, Idaho, (R. 90).
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She had not completed her last year of high school (R.
189). Shortly after the marriage, the defendant quit
teaching and enlisted in the Navy. The parties moved to
California and his wife sought employment, first in a
restaurant (R. 91) and later in a drug store (R. 92).
Fro1n that tiu1e forward until the time of the divorce
?\[rs. Tre1nayne was gainfully employed (R. 94 and 96)'
except for one nine month period when both of them attended the Utah Agricultural College at Logan (R. 99)
and other short periods of time while she was attempting
to find work after plaintiff and defendant had moved to
a ne'v town. While the defendant was in the Navy he
set up a saving schedule, requiring the plaintiff to save
at least $200.00 per month (R. 94 and 188). When he
first enlisted in the Navy, he was earning only $75.00
per month. Later his pay was increased so that he was
receiving approximately $180.00 per month (R. 213).
He sent part of his earnings home to his wife, and she
saved all that he sent (R. 188). She then saved sufficient from her own earnings to make the total amount
saved $200.00 ,per month (R. 188). In this manner the
parties saved in excess of $5,000.00 and had that amount
on hand when he left the service (R. 96). When ~Ir.
Tremayne first left the service the parties moved to
Mountain Home, Idaho, where he taught school for one
school year. His wife, at his insistence, (R. 173) procured a job at a bank where she earned $90.00 p·er month

II
j

j

Navy, he purchased a car (R. 97) but with their addi-

1

tional savings during their stay at Mountain Home, the

I

~

(R. 98). At the time defendant was discharged from the
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$5,000.00 in saYings ''Tas still substantially intaet \vhen
they started school at Logan (1~. 99). Both of then1 at-

tended school for three quarters at Logan (R. 99). Thereafter, the plaintiff \Yas required to quit school and go
to work. The parties left school at Logan in June of
19-±7 and the defendant elected to go to Berkeley, California, where he attended the University of California
(R. 101). He attended the University at Berkeley one
semester which would be equivalent to about a quarter
and one half of schooling (R. 101). While the defendant attended school at Berkeley, the plaintiff continued
to work. 'She had a good job at the Bank of America and
did not want to leave it (R. 102). The defendant wanted
to leave California and return to Utah, so plaintiff gave
up her job and returned with him. 'The defendant then
attended the University of Utah for four full quarters
(R. 107). Again the plaintiff obtained employment in
the First National Bank and later at the University of
Utah (R. 106). The defendant by that time had earned
sufficient credits to entitle him to a Masters Degree.
He had not yet completed his thesis (R. 109) but it was
fifty per cent complete (R. 110). A student working
under normal conditions can obtain a Masters Degree in
three quarters of intensive work, after he obtains his
Bachelor's Degree (R. 109). Nearly all of them get
Master's Degrees in four quarters (R. 109). The defendant attended four quarters at the University of Utah
and one and one half quarters at the University of California but still he had not completed the work for his
l\Iaster's Degree (R. 110). During all of the time exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cept the period of time at the Utah State Agricultural
College at Logan, his wife worked full time, maintained
the apartment, cooked the meals at home, and also did
all of the laundry (R. 171). During the seven years o.f
their married life, the parties moved a total of 22 times,
and each time the plaintiff was required to re-establish
herself in employment (R. 234). She was unable either
to establish seniority in a job or to increase her earning
power.
During the time the defendant was in the service,
he urged plaintiff to live frugally, forego the purchase of
new clothing and save all the money she could save
so that they could both go to school. H.e also assured
her that when he returned he would arrange to get her
new clothing (R. 95 and 197). The evidence is that
she did so live and that during most of that time the
clothing that she wore was clothing which she owned
before her marriage. She testified that she looked
"shabby" ( R. 17 and 197). He testified that the G. I.
Bill of Rights paid him $90.00 per month at first and
later $105.00 per month, but that thi.s was not sufficient
to support. him and his wife while he attended school
(R. 30). Had his wife not worked while he attended
school, it was his opinion that there would have been
no p.rop·erty whatever left at the time of the divorce
(R. 128 and 129).
It is interesting to note the nature of the property
which the parties aequired. Both parties testified that
he objected to her using her money to purchase p·ersonal
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iten1s for herself (R. 12:~ and 171) ....-\t the sa1ne thne
he purchased an auton1obile for $800.00 (R. 7). He also
purchased a car-trailer for $65.00 '""hich '""ould have been
convenient for use in his frequent hunting trips (R. 189).
He purchased t'Yo guns while he was attending school
(R. 126) and expended a total of $166.00 therefor (R.
150). They owned a type,vriter which was needed by
him in connection with his school work (R. 222) ; a library consisting of many books, but according to his
testimony, they were books that had peculiar value to
him and in which she would have little interest (R.
223). He carried a life insurance .policy. Her money
was in part used to pay the premiums, but at all times
he insisted that the beneficiary named in th·e policy be his
mother rather than his wife (R. 121). They also had a
washing machine so that his wife could do the laundry
at home (R. 171). They had practically no social life
(R. 179) and he objected to her taking dancing because
it cost too much (R. 192).
His wife desired to go to s·chool when he completed
his schooling at the University of Utah (R.. 192). He
advised her she had all the education she needed and
that she should continue working to help acquire a home.
He then made it known to his wife that he considered
himself to be her intellectual superior and constantly referred to her lack of Hducation (R. 168). He thus induced his wife to deprive herself of even the normal personal effects, to wear ''shabby clothes'', to move from
base to base and town to town with him a total of 22
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times ( R. 234). He insisted that in each of the new locations she procure work (R. 173) and that her earnings
be accounted for (R. 94 and 188). He loafed through
school and after six quarters of graduate work he had
not completed the work for a Master's Degree and he
admits that practically all political science students complete their Master's Degree in four quarters and that
many are able to do it in three (R. 109). He also had
3 quarters of undergraduate school at Logan. Having
completed such education as he desired, (a total of 27
months in school), he refused further ·education to his
wife (R. 192). Then through what the court has adjudicated to be his fault, he caused his wife to procure
a divorce so that she could not participate in the benefits of the education which she gave him. ;The meagre
property which they had accumulated under his own
testimony would have been non-existent hut for her work
(R. 128) yet he demanded that he be given one-half
thereof; that his education be totally disregarded and
even went so far as to urge at the trial that his wife
sell her wedding and engagement rings and give him
half the proceeds from the sale (R. 233.). He now puts
her to the exp·ens;e of an appeal where the total difference
between what his prayer asks for and what the court
awarded him is less than $375.00.
It is clearly demonstrated by the record that the
additional college ·education which he received while these
parties were married is worth at least $640.00 per year
(R. 156). In this regard Mr. Hardy of the State Board
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of Education testified that in the l\l urray School Dis-.
trict and in every other sehool district in the state,
there are basic salary schedules which are paid to
teachers depending on the amount of formal education
that thev
. have had. In l\Iurra.v.. the basic salary for a
teacher with less than four years of college is $2090;
"ith a Bachelor's D·egree, it is $2630, and with a Master's
Degree, it is $2730. Since the defendant has the equivalent of a Master's Degree this additional education was
worth $640.00 to him during the first year since the
divorce and will continue to be worth at least that much
to him .per year throughout the remainder of his life
(R. 156). His present salary of $2700.00 (R. 111) together with his own testimony that he has more than
sufficient credit hours for a Master's Degree (R. 107110) indicates th~t the school district is placing such a
value on his additional education. From another approach, it seems clear that the combined efforts of these
two people throughout seven years of married life have
all been invested in his education, and the record is clear
that at least the $5,000.00 in savings, plus her continued
earnings were so utilize-d (R. 231).
The plaintiff is in a less fortunate position. She
moved sixteen times while he was in the service and
several time-s thereafter (R. 96 and 234). In each instance she was required to give up~ her job and find new
employment. ·She was seventeen years old when she was
married, had less than a high school education and has
not been able to improve her earning power since that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time (R. 190). Her chances of a successful remarriage
are depreciated by the seven years she devoted to this
.
n1arr1age.
The parties separated in N oven1ber, 1948. The defendant continued to reside in the old apartment. The
plaintiff found new living quarters and had the expense
incident to moving (R. 209). She was earning take-homepay of $110.00 per month and gross pay of $160.00 per
month (R. 105). He was earning gross pay of $230.00
per month and take home pay of $180.00 (R. 110). Thus
during November, December, January and February
while they were still man and wife he had $70.00 more
per month to live on than she did or a total of $480.00
(R. 233). This was considered by the trial court (R. 37).
In addition, the defendant had been unemployed during all of 1948 until about the time of their more serious
divorce discussion. At that time he quit school at the
University of Utah so that he could support himself.
U·p until that time his wife, being the sole breadwinner,
had claimed the defendant as a dependent for income
tax p·urp·oses. ·When he started to work in September,
he ~!aimed himself as a dependent and the final result
was that her employer had not withheld sufficient moneys
from her salary from January 1st to September 1st and
she was required to pay additional income tax on wages
earned from January to 'September, 1948. These wages
were used both by plaintiff and defendant for his education. The legal deduction which 'the Murray School District would be required by law to deduct from his salary
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'vould exceed the an1ount of his ultimate tax because he
only ""'"orked five months. He thus would get a tax re- ·
ftmd, the amount of 'vhich does not appear in the record,
and she had a tax deficiency of from $45.00 to $50.00
'vhich the court compelled her to assume (R. 65, 86, 174,
37).
From the time of the November separation until the
date of the trial the defendant held possession of all
the .property except the radio (R. 202). Even items like
the washing machine he kept and delivered to his own
parents (R. 132). He thus had the exclusive use of the
property from November to February. Thereafter, it
took an order to show cause and several garnishments
to compel even token compliance with the judgment of
the court. He filed his appeal on impecunious affidavit
and even to this day has deprived her of the benefits
of the judgment by depositing the alimony and payments
for further property settlement with the clerk of the
court without ever having obtained a court order permitting him to do so.
ASSIGNMENTS OF· ERROR ON CRO·SS· APPEAL
The plaintiff and respondent assigns the following
errors in support of her cross appeal:
1. The Court Erred In Awarding To The Defendant Any Property.
2. The Court Erred in Finding That The Typewriter Ha.d a Value Of $100.00.
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3. The Court Erred In Finding That The Automobile Had A Value Of Only $500.00.
4. The Court Erred In Finding That The Library
Books Had A Value Of Only $50.00.
Each of the above assignments of error is· based on
the grounds that the court's finding and conclusions
thereon are contrary to law and are against the evidence.
ARGUMFJNT
1.

THE DIVISION OF JOINT PROPERTY UPON THE GRANTING OF

A DIVORCE RESTS IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

The right to a divorce and the law relating thereto
is and from the very beginning has been statutory. This
is too well settled to require citation of authority. In
regard to the division of property the court is controlled
by the· Statutes. The particular section relating to the
division of property is Sec:tion 40-3-5, Ut,ah Code An-

not:ate.d, 1943, which

~provides

:

''When a decree of divorce is made the court
may make such order in relation to ... property
... and the maintenance of the parties ... as may
be equitable."
There is thus no standard prescribed. The court
is simply to do what it deems just and equitable. Under
such a circumstance, where no definite standards are
fixed, it is uniformly held throughout all jurisdictions
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that the n1atter rests in the sound discretion of the trial
judge.
This has been expressly affirmed in Utah in several
recent opinions. See ..:.4.llen vs. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165
P. 2nd 872; Anderson vs. Anaerson., 104 Utah 104, 138
P. 2nd 252; and Woolley vs. vVoolley, (Utah), 19·5 P. 2nd
743. In Allen vs. Allen, supTta, the question on appeal
related solely to alimony and property division. The
court asked the question :
'' \V.hen should the appellate court in divorce
proceedings vacate the findings and decree of the
trial court and substitute its judgment for that
of the judge who observed the demeanor of the
,parties and witnesses and heard the testimony,
when the appeal relates only to the determination
of alimony and division of property.''
The court then said:
''There are numerous ·decisions of this court
holding that the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment in a divorce proceeding relative
to alimony and division of prop·erty for that of
the trial court unless the record clearly discloses
that the trial court's decree in such matters is
plainly arbitrary.''
The other cases are to the same effect. They are in
harmony with prior Utah holdings and with the uniform
holdings of the courts of all of the Western jurisdictions.
See Ra~te~son vs. Patterson (Arizona), 163 P. 2nd 850;
l3w~eeley vs. Sw:eeley, (California), 170 P. 2nd 670; Zo10:k
vs. Zook, (Colorado), 195 P. 2nd 387; Fish vs. Fish,
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(Idaho), 170 P. 2nd 802; Gates vs. Gates, (Kansas), 163
P. 2nd 395; Strickland vs. Strickland, (Oregon), 192 P.
2nd, 986; and OZark vs. ,Cla,rk, (Washington), 199 P. 2nd
67. "\\Te, therefore, are confronted at the outset with the
fact that the trial court has great discretion in matters
of this kind. Here there is no appeal from the part of
the judgment awarding the divorce to the plaint1ff. The
appeal relates solely to the division of property.
The Utah Sup-reme Court has ,enumerated the
various items which it considers important in determining whether or not a particular property division is reasonable and equitable. These matters have been set forth
in several opinions, namely, Anderson vs. Anderson,
supra.; Allevn vs. Allen, supra; and Pinion ·vs. Piwi;on, 92
Utah 2·55, 67 P. 2nd 265. These items as listed are:
'' (1) Ages of the parties when married.
(2) Duration of marriage. (3) What did the
parties surrender or give up by marriage. 4. What
property, if any, did the parties contribute upon
marriage. (5) The amount of property and kind
now held by the parties. (6) The ability and
opportunities of each party to earn money. (7)
Financial condition and necessities of each party,
including abilities to save and care for earnings.
(8) Health of the parties. (9) The standard or
mode of living of the parties.''
In regard to the ages of the parties, the plaintiff was
seventeen at the time of the marriage and the defendant twenty three, so they are still relatively young and
have much of their lives before them.
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The 1narriage endured fro1n Decen1ber 19, 1941, to
February, 1949, or a period of over seven years. To the
writer of this brief, this seems to be a substantial period
of time when it is considered that the total effort of
the parties during that entire period of time was directed toward his education, and the ~p,laintiff deprived
herself of the normal personal privileges and pleasures
of a young married couple to make this result possible.
In answer to the question ''What ·did the parties
surrender or give up by marriage~'' we state the following: The plaintiff left high s-chool before completing it.
She utilized the period of her life that normally would
have been devoted to further education and cultural development. It is this period between seventeen and
twenty-four when young people normally get the necessary education to equip them to earn a livelihood later
in life. It is also during this ip,eriod that a girl's chances
of marriage are best. The defendant had completed three
years of college, he was slated for duty with the Armed
Services and had everything to gain and nothing to lose
from the marriage.
Neither of the parties had any property at the time
they were married. The property which they acquired
during the marriage is meagre. Its acquisition was made
possible entirely because of the willingness of the plaintiff to live frugally, work hard, and remain employed
\\~hile ·her husband went to school. Except for this, even
under his own testimony, there would have been no
assets to divide.
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In regard to the ability and opportunities of each
party to earn money, it should be noted that the defendant is now equipped with his Master's Degree which has
substantial~present cash value to him in his school teaching profession. The plaintiff has worked at many jobs
in many areas and has not been able to improve her
earning capacity at all. She has not established seniority
in any job nor established the good will of any employer.
In fact, her frequent moves and her inability to stay
fixed on any job has undoubtedly given her a reputation
among employers of being unstable and undependable.
Her present take home pay of $110.00 per month is certainly inadequate to pay for her present living and to
procure further education. With a property division
which would give her the property which has been acquired, and by this, I mean all of it, she might have
be·en able by working days and attending school at
night -to get further education. ·She certainly can not
ever do as the defendant did, simply discontinue all work
and go to school for twenty~eight months. This would
not be possible even were she given all the property.
She could, however, if awarded all of the property, pay
her tuition at some school, acquire books and attend
night school where she could improve her earning capacity.
Plaintiff's present necessities are now greater than
defendant's for she must attempt to get an education.
There is ~every indication that the plaintiff has the
ability to save and care for money and no indication that
the defendant lacks these attributes. Each must provide
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hin1self with the comn1on necessities of life. The defendant is no"r better equipped to do this than is the plaintiff. It should be noted that the plaintiff has the necessity of procuring clothing and personal ~effects for because of her frugal living during the years of her marriage, she did not acquire the personal effects and clothing that normally would be acquired in a marriage of
this duration.
Both parties appear to be in good health. The desires of the parties for the finer things in life a~ppear
to be well cultivated, but their financial ability to acquire and enjoy the better things in lif,e has always been
hampered by the necessity of keeping the defendant in
school.
On the strength of th·e above and in view of the fact
that defendant was found by the court to he the party
at fault, we submit that the court should have awarded
to the plaintiff a larger percentage of the p.rop·erty. Even
with all the property she will never be able to equal the·:
education for hers-elf that she helped the defendant acquire. The defendant has already acquired his education
and established a good earning capacity. Any needs
which he has in the future can be ~easily met hy his present earning power. He needs no further education and,
should have no further ·expense in ~equi,pping himself to
meet the p~roblems of life. She has all of that expense
ahead of her and a smaller earning capacity. Her only
hope of acquiring an ·education is in the property which
her earnings acquired. The court cannot give her a
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college education, which she wants so much, but it can·
give her the means by which she can acquire it. She
is cultured a~d refined and craves a higher education
and an opportunity to live a cultured social life. 'Sihe
will never be able to attain that objective through her
own earnings because she has never had the training
necessary to create a higher earning power. It was
through her effort that the defendant obtained his present advantageous position. It is also through her ·efforts that the meagre property which they acquired is
in existence. But for her, his education could only have
been gotten through incurring indebtedness. Had she
not worked, he would have had to forego his education
or go in debt to get it and this fight would he over the
obligation of the parties to ~pay the family debts rather
than over the division of the property. We are sincere
in urging to the court that it award to th~ plaintiff all
of the property and feel that it is the only just and
equitable thing which can be done. However, the plaintiff would never have appealed had not the defendant
prosecuted his appeal and worked as he did to prevent
her from realizing anything on any of this property.
The above dis!poses of the first assignm·ent of error.
The other four . are only. of importance if the court
~

concludes that the defendant should be awarded some of
the property. If it so concludes, then we submit that the
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trial court placed too low a value on the property which
it awarded to the defendant and placed too high a value
on some of the property awarded to the plaintiff.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VALUING THE TYPEWRITER AT

$100.00.

By its finding number six the trial court found that
the typewriter was now worth $100.00. It cost only
$100.00 new (R. 144). Defendant testified that it was
only worth $75.00 '(R. 144), and this is the only testimony
on this i tern.
3.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AUTOMOBILE WAS

WORTH ONLY

$500.00.

At the trial the plaintiff testified that in her opinion
the car was worth more than $500.00 and she wanted
to take the car if it was to be valued so low (R. 205).
An expert was called to fix the value of the car. He
testified that it could be sold to a used car lot for $500.00,
but if sold by a used car lot it would bring $650.00 (R.
227). If the car could be sold at a ·retail price of $650.00,
that was its value. Certainly the value of a .p~roduct is
not what it can be sold for wholesale t:o a dealer. Had
the car been advertised and sold directly to a prospectiv·e
purchaser who intended to utilize it for his own use,
rather than for resale, this expert fixed its value at
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$650.00. Had plaintiff desired to purchase a car like it,
that is what she would have been required to pay.
Of course, the plaintiff would not want the car now
at a value of $650.00. The used car market has dropped
considerably and the car has been utilized by the defendant since the date of the trial. Yet it still is clear from
the record that at the time of the trial the car was
actually worth $650.00 and that it very likely could have
been turned into that much cash.
4.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LIBRARY BOOKS

WERE WORTH ONLY

$50.00.

The evidence showed that there were sixty-one books
which had been acquired by the parties (R.. 58). Plaintiff testified that many of them had as much value to
her as they did to the defendant and that she would like
to have some of them (R. 203). On cross examination of
an expert witness called by the defendant, the court told
counsel for the plaintiff not to proceed with his cross
examination on this item for the court would accept the
value of $15.00 .placed on the hooks by the defendant's
expert and would award them to the plaintiff (R. 225).
In reliance upon this statement counsel for plaintiff discontinued all further cross examination of the witness.
Then the court awarded the books to the defendant
at a value of only $50.00.
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The court's a\va.rd may be summarized as follows:
To Plaintiff

Radio ------------------------------------·----------------------------$
Typewriter ----------------------------------------------·------asl1er -----------------------------------------------------------Insurance Policy -----------------------------------------Cash ------------------------------------·------------------___ ------Terminal Leave Bond____________________________________
Alimony and further settlement--------------~---

"T'

400.00
100.00
75.00
51.00
125.00
425.00
475.00

$1651.00
Less Income Tax Payable ---------------------------45.00
Total _____ -------______________________ --------------------...$1606.00
To Defenma;n;t

Car Trailer ----~-----------------------------------------------$
Automobile --------------------------------------------------Boo·ks --------------------------------------------------·-----------Guns ------------------------------------------------·---------------Insurance Policy --------------------------------·------------

50.00
500.00
50.00
130.00
151.00

$881.00
With the above it must also be remembered that
the defendant received one insurance policy that had no
determined cash surrender value, but it was a $1,000.00
twenty-pay-life insurance policy which had been in force
several years and it certainly had some value (R. 238).
Had the court granted the defendant's prayer it would
have awarded him one half of $2487.00, less the value of
this insurance policy. In other words, about $1200.00.
The $881.00 plus the.insurance policy makes a difference
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between his prayer and the court's actual award of only
about $350.00. Had the court put the value on the property that it should have the ty,pewriter would have been
reduced to $75.00 and the plaintiff would then have had
only $1581.00. The car would have been increased to
$650.00 and the books at least another $50.00. This raises
defendant's award to $1081 plus the insurance policy.
This would have been so close to the result actually
prayed for by the defendant's answer that the difference would not have paid half the costs of this appeal!
We submit that the court was more liberal to the
defendant than it should have been. Any modification
which is made of the judgment should be in favor of
a larger award to the plaintiff. To reduce the amount
awarded to the plaintiff would be a palpable injustice.
PART II.
1.

THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY BY THE COURT WAS NOT UN-

F,AIR TO THE DEFENDANT.

We now turn to an analysis of the arguments ad~
vanced by the defendant on his appeal. His first contention is that the court awarded the defendant too little
of the joint property. Insofar as the facts are concerned, this has already been fully covered above. In
regard to the law, the defendant relies entirely on the
case of Lwndgreen V's. Lwndgreen, 184 P. 2d. 670. That
case could not possibly be of help here. There both
parties had been married previously. H·ere was a marriage between a seventeen year old high school girl
and a twenty-three year old school teacher. There the
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parties were over seventy years of age, and the joint
property came from relief cheeks which were payable
to both. Neither had obtained any great benefit from the
marriage and the court divided the property equally.
Counsel for the defendant argued below and again on
appeal that this Lundgreen case requires that the property be divided equally. Such simply is not its holding.
Each divorce case is judged on its own facts. The court
must make an award that is equitable and in determining what is equitable the nine things, among others, set
forth in Allen vs. Allen, su,pra, are to a large extent
controlling. There is no authority cited by defendant
that even suggests a result contrary to that urged b~
plaintiff under part one of this brief.
2.

THE TERMINAL LEAVE BOND.

The second contention of the defendant is that the
court erred in its judgment relating to the terminal leave
bond. We simply cannot understand why the defendant
makes this contention now. At the trial he was asked
specifically if he wanted the terminal leave bond to be
considered in the property division and he answered tha.t
he did (R. 133). He w~s asked:

"Q. You weren't going to put in your war
bond you got when mustered out, were you.
A. That's right. Q. You were going to keep that1
A. Not necessarily; I was going to divide with
her, fifty-fifty on everything."
The terminal leave bond is also set out in the complaint
as the part of the joint property. (See paragraph 6, R.
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4.) The allegations of paragrap-h six are admitted by
paragraph three of the answer (R. 15). The answer
then prays for an equal division of that property which,
as noted, included this terminal leave bond. It should
also be noted that the court asked defendant to enumerate the property which he wanted. The defendant did
so and specifically included the car and the terminal
leave bond in the property that he wanted the court to
award to him (R. 222). It is thus clear that at no time
in the court below did the defendant prior to the court's
judgment indicate that he contended that this- bond was
not part of the property to be disposed of.
Next it is to he noted that the court did not order
the defendant to t.urn the bond over to the plaintiff..What
was ordered was that the defendant "cash the terminal
leave bond held by him with the approximate value of
$425.00 and to pay to the plaintiff the proceeds thereof
including interest, or in the alternative to pay to the
plaintiff the equivalent amount in cash" (R. 40). No
time is fixed for the payment. The court simply dete·rmined that the plaintiff was to have that amount out of
the ·joint prop·erty. It could be paid either by cashing
the bond or from other sources. The contention that
this was the only source from which defendant could
have paid it is. not correct. The actual value of the other
property awarded to him was nearly $900.00. Further,
he was employed and with no time having been fixed
for the ~p'ayment, he could have paid it from earnings.
When later counsel for defendant advised counsel for
the plaintiff that he was not going to comply with the
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order of the court unless compelled to do so a petition
for an order to show cause "'"as filed ( R. 247). It alleged
that defendant's counsel had advised that he was not
going to comply with the court's order but would resist
it by every legal means (R. 46). The defendant then
sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the hearing of
the order to show cause. The Supreme Court denied this
petition for a writ of prohibition (R. 243). The trial court
then brought the order to show cause on for hearing.
The defendant was ordered to bring the bond with him
to court. Instead he deposited money with the clerk of
the court (R. 50). It does not appear whether the money
was from the bond or otherwise.
Thus while the court ordered defendant to bring
the bond to court, it neither ordered him to cash it nor
to surrender its proceeds to plaintiff. It only required him to .p~ay the proceeds or in the alternative
to pay an equal amount of cash from some other source.
It was only after defendant indicated that he was not
going to comp~y with the court's order that any attempt
was made to assert direct jurisdiction over the bond.
The actual taking of jurisdiction never materialized b·ecause the defendant deposited an equal amount of cash.
Even were the order to be construed as a judgment
awarding the bond to the p·laintiff, it does not follow
that the court erred. In the first place the statute quoted
by the defendant does not say that the existence of he
bond as an asset must be ignored in entering a divorce
decree. It is doubtful that the statute was intended to
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But giving the statute the meaning that defendant contends for it, it still leaves the trial court free to consider
the fact that the hond is in existence. The court is not
required to "shut its eyes" to the fact that the bond
exists. It should make an equitable division of the property and in doing so should consider the existence of
the bond. Had the defendant raised this contention in the
court below there is every reason to believe that the
court would have awarded the plaintiff the car and other
property in lieu of the bond. In fact it did not award her
the bond-it just awarded her a certain amount of cash
to be paid from the proceeds of the bond or otherwise.
The cross appeal will, of course, enable this court to
make such adjustment of the property as it deems fit. If
under any possible construction the statute relied upon
by defendant has been violated, which we strongly deny,
then the court has before it all provisions of the lower
court's judgment and could award the car and other property to plaintiff or could order a straight cash payment
in lieu of the bond. This latter, we submit, the trial court
has already done.
3.

ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The last contention of the defendant is that the court
erred in awarding a fifty dollar attorney fee on the order
to show cause. The record is clear that the defendant
'vas in violation of the court's judgment. The court had
ordered defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $35.00
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~larch

1, 1949. It had also awarded her p.roperty

that ",.as still in his possession. Defendant, through his
counsel, had filed notice of appeal and had been advised
that unless he procured a stay bond pending appeal,
plaintiff would enforce the judgment (R. 247). No stay
bond was filed. Co:unsel for defendant apparently had
the mistaken idea that the statutes gave him five days
within 'vhich to file a "Stay Bond" (R. 247). The five
days allowed by law, is of course, for the filing of a
'~Cost Bond'' on appeal. The judgment is not stayed by
the appeal or by the Cost Bond. It is stayed only by complying with Title 104, Chapter 41, U.C.A. 1943. This the
defendant had not done nor has he done so to this date.
The plaintiff, therefore, brought her order to show caus·e
which was issued March 2, 1949 (R. 50). The defendant
sought a writ of ~prohibition on which plaintiffs attorney
appeared and successfully defeated. The hearing was
then had on the order to show cause. By this time the
defendant had complied with part of the court order in
that he had deposited with the clerk of the court $459.34
representing the value of the bond. It does not app·ear
whether defendant cashed the bond or p·rocured. the
cash elsewhere. ~But it was deposited (R. 61). The defendant was also compelled to deposit the title to the
car with the clerk of the court. The court found that the
defendant had "failed to obey the order of the court,
but his failure was not with a willful intent to disobey
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the court order, but in reliance upon advice of counsel
that he need not pay it" (R. 61). For that reason he
was not punished for contempt of court. The court then
directed defendant to pay the $35.00 installment, which
should have been paid on March 1, 1949, on March 15,
1949.
We submit that the order to show cause was necessary; that the defendant had failed to obey the -court's
order; that the bringing of the order to show cause
resulted in substantial compliance with the order of
the court and that the work of plaintiff's attorney in
accomplishing the above was worth more than the $50.00.
allowed.
Defendant's brief gives the impression that the defendant was found to he without fault and for that reason he was not punished for contempt. ·The fact is that
he was in violation of the court's order, but the violation
was upon advice of counsel and not wilful. The court
therefore simply ordered comp·liance with its prior order
and excused the defendant's violation.
CONCLUSIO:N

The trial court's order dividing the joint property
Is ~presumptively correct. It will only be modified if
there has been a clear abuse of discretion. If any abuse
of discretion is involved it was in awarding to the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
fendant too mueh of the eommunity property. Even
if all of it were awarded to the plaintiff she could not
procure for herself the years of college training that her
earnings, \vork and frugal living enabled the defendant
to acquire. By their joint efforts his earning capacity
\Vas greatly enhanced. Then, because of his wrongs, she
was prohibited from reaping the benefits of that enhanced earning power. There is little that the court
can do to remedy the injustice that has been done her
for little property was acquired. It can, however, and
should award her a larger percentage of the joint pToperty.
There are at least three reasons why the argument
on the terminal leave bond is unsound: (1) It is raised
for the first time on appeal. (2) It misconstrues the
court order which simp,ly does not award the bond to
the plaintiff, It awarded her cash equal to the value of
the bond. (B) There is no error for the court can in any
event consider the existence of the bond in making its
equitable division of joint property.
The $50.00 award of attorneys fees was correct for
the defendant had violated the court order and only
by affirmative action could compliance be obtained. His
actions caused the order to show cause to issue and its
h;:-:;uance assured compliance with the court order. It is
only fair that the expense of that proceedings be borne
by him.
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Last, the court should award to the plaintiff at least
another $200.00 for attorneys fees on this appeal. The
$150 already paid was to the extent of ap·proximate $50.00
used for printing this brief and paying the costs of
the ·cross appeal. The balance of $100.00 is simply not
adequate for the work done on the appeal and for the
work done since the order to show cause by way of
garnishments. 'l'he plaintiff therefore respectfully submits that an additional $200.00 should be allowed as attorneys fees on this appeal.
Respectfuliy submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE
Attorneys for Respondent.
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